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This paper investigates the role that excess cash plays in explaining actual open market share 
reacquisitions and examines the impact of agency problems on the payout decision. Using data 
from the U.K., where disclosure regulations make it possible to directly measure the volume and 
value of shares reacquired, we find that repurchase activity clusters in cash generative industries 
where investment opportunities are scarce. Holding investment opportunities constant at the firm 
level, we find that abnormally high cash flows from operating and (to a lesser extent) investing 
activities drive both the probability of a repurchase and the amount spent reacquiring shares. 
Comparing a subset of repurchases that are unambiguously driven by the desire to distribute 
surplus cash with a cash-matched sample of nonrepurchasing firms, we find that repurchasers are 
characterized by lower managerial entrenchment. Repurchasers also report superior 
improvements in postrepurchase operating performance and are less likely either to fail or be 
targeted in corporate control contests during the two-year period following the payout decision. 
Our results support the view that managers use share reacquisitions as flexible tool for 
distributing transitory cash surpluses, but only in the absence of serious agency problems between 
inside and outside shareholders. 
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 Open Market Share Reacquisitions, Surplus Cash, and Agency 
Problems 
Firms are increasingly turning to share repurchases as a means of distributing cash to 
shareholders. In the U.S., Grullon and Michaely (2000) estimate that industrial firms spent more 
repurchasing shares in 1999 and 2000 than they paid out in dividends. Compared with dividends, 
repurchases are viewed as providing greater payout flexibility, particularly in the presence of 
temporary cash flow surpluses (Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000)). Firms also use repurchases to offset earnings dilution resulting from employee stock 
option plans (Kahle (2002), Fenn and Liang (2001)) and to exploit market mispricing (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000 and 1995)). Consistent with the U.S. experience, the fashion 
for share repurchases is increasingly evident in other jurisdictions. For example, Ikenberry et al. 
(2000) document a 140 percent rise in the dollar value of repurchase programs announced by 
Canadian firms between 1989 and 1997. Lasfer (2001) reports similar levels of growth among 
European companies. 
 In this paper, we use U.K. data to explore the association between share reacquisitions, 
excess cash, and firms’ corporate governance arrangements. Despite growing evidence 
concerning the advantages of repurchases as a method of distributing transitory cash shocks, prior 
research on the links between corporate liquidity, agency costs, and payout decisions focuses 
primarily on cash holdings and (or) dividend payments (e.g., Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 
(2003), Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003), Harford (1999), 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)). In contrast, the intervening effect of agency 
problems on the use of share repurchases for distributing temporary cash windfalls has been 
largely ignored. 
We begin by examining the association between actual open market share reacquisitions 
and firms cash position using a comprehensive panel of repurchase data from 1995 through 2000. 
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 We restrict our focus to open market repurchases because self-tender offers are extremely rare in 
the U.K. Several features make the U.K. an attractive setting in which to investigate the link 
between repurchases and excess cash. First, the volume and value of shares repurchased in the 
open market are directly observable. This contrasts with the U.S. where a lack of disclosure 
means that precise measures of the number and cost of open market repurchases are not available 
(Dittmar (2000), Jagannathan et al. (2000), Stephens and Weisbach (1998)). Second, the 
prevailing regulatory environment affords relatively sharp tests of the link between shares 
repurchases and excess cash because fewer competing motives for reacquisitions exist. For 
example, open market share repurchases are not driven by attempts to offset the dilutive impact of 
employee stock option plans in the U.K. because reacquired shares cannot be reissued to fund 
option exercises.1 Further, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) demonstrate how regulations restrict firms’ 
opportunities to use open market buybacks to exploit mispricing. Third, the U.K. is one of the few 
markets outside the U.S. where share repurchases are commonplace. For example, Lasfer (2001) 
finds that U.K. firms account for almost 80% of aggregate European share repurchase activity. 
Consistent with the surplus cash hypothesis, we find that repurchase activity clusters in 
cash generative industries with poor investment opportunities. Holding investment opportunities 
constant at the firm level, we find that temporarily high cash flow performance explains both the 
likelihood and value of repurchases. These results support Guay and Harford’s (2000) and 
Jagannathan et al.’s (2000) conclusions that repurchases are used to distribute temporary cash 
surpluses in a timely manner. Similar to Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998), we also find that repurchases are associated with poor recent stock price performance. 
                                                 
1 U.K. firms are not permitted to use the treasury stock method of accounting for share repurchases. 
Companies wishing to fund their employee stock option programs from issued shares are therefore forced 
to set up a wholly-owned trust company to repurchase shares on behalf of the firm and then issue them to 
employees. The shares acquired by these trust companies do not meet the legal definition of a share 
repurchase and are therefore not included in our sample. Accordingly, none of the firms in our sample 
mention offsetting earnings dilution by stock option compensation plans among their list of repurchase 
reasons. In contrast, Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2003) report that 66% of U.S. managers 
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 Consistent with the regulatory restrictions highlighted by Rau and Vermaelen (2002), however, 
the underpricing effect is of strictly second order importance.  
Having established that U.K. firms use share reacquisitions to distribute transitory cash 
surpluses, we turn our attention to the question of what motivates managers to return these 
surpluses to shareholders in the first place. Although the presence of excess cash may be an 
important determinant of repurchase payouts, it is not a sufficient condition. Agency theory 
predicts that conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders can result in excess cash being 
retained or invested unproductively, rather than being distributed via dividends or share 
repurchases. All else equal, therefore, agency theory predicts that the decision to pay out 
temporary cash surpluses by repurchasing shares will be conditional on the magnitude of the 
agency costs of managerial discretion.  
Existing evidence on the agency costs of corporate liquidity and their impact on payout 
policy is mixed. Opler et al. (1999) study the determinants of cash holdings and find little 
evidence of an association with agency problems. Instead, they conclude that cash holdings are 
primarily driven by the costs of cash shortfalls and external financing. Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003) study U.S. firms with persistently high cash holdings and reach a similar conclusion. In 
contrast, Harford (1999) reports that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions, and 
that cash-rich bidders overpay in acquisitions and exhibit poorer postacquisition operating 
performance. Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) also find that U.S. firms with potentially high 
agency costs are more likely to overpay in acquisitions, while Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1994) demonstrate that firms in receipt of large cash windfalls use these surpluses to 
fund non-value-increasing activities. More recently, a number of studies have used international 
data to shed further light on the issue. The findings of this body of work broadly support the 
agency cost explanation of cash holdings. For example, Dittmar et al. (2003) model international 
                                                                                                                                                 
surveyed identified stock options as either an important or very important factor influencing their 
repurchase decision. 
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 variation in cash holdings and conclude that firms in countries with poor shareholder protection 
hold more cash because minority investors are unable to force entrenched managers to disgorge 
surplus balances. Pinkowitz et al. (2003) also find that firms in countries with poorer investor 
protection hold more cash (after controlling for economic development and risk) and that 
consistent with an agency cost interpretation, these holdings are heavily discounted by minority 
shareholders in such regimes. Using both firm- and country-level tests, Kalcheva and Lins (2004) 
find that minority shareholders discount the value of firms with a combination of high cash 
holdings and expected managerial entrenchment, and that the magnitude of this discount is more 
pronounced in countries where minority shareholder rights are weakest. 
Contrary to the predictions of agency theory, Opler et al. (1999) report that total cash 
payouts to shareholders are increasing in the level of excess cash. On the other hand, the 
sensitivity of payouts to changes in excess cash is very low, suggesting that agency considerations 
may impact on payout decisions. International evidence strongly supports the agency model of 
corporate cash distributions. La Porta et al. (2000) report that firms pay out more of their earnings 
in the form of dividends in countries with good legal protection for shareholders. Kalcheva and 
Lins (2004) find that minority shareholders place a valuation premium on dividend paying firms 
where expected managerial entrenchment is high and that this premium is more pronounced in 
countries with poor shareholder rights for minorities. 
We explore the impact of agency problems on the use of share reacquisitions to distribute 
surplus cash by focusing on a subset of firms where the decision to reacquire shares is 
unambiguously driven by a desire to distribute excess cash. We match these cases with firms 
from the same industry with similar cash flow profiles but which elected not to distribute their 
excess cash (either via a share repurchase or special dividend). Comparison of the two groups 
provides no support for the view that repurchasers pay out cash as a result of lower growth 
opportunities or reduced costs of external financing. Instead, we find that repurchasers are 
characterized by less managerial entrenchment, as reflected in lower insider stock ownership and 
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 stronger board monitoring. In the postrepurchase period, we find that reacquiring firms display 
significantly higher improvements in operating performance, face fewer disciplinary corporate 
control contests, and are less likely to fail. Our results point to agency problems between insider 
and outsider shareholders as a potentially important determinant of the decision to distribute 
transitory cash surpluses by repurchasing shares. 
Section I summarizes the regulation of share reacquisitions in the U.K. and describes our 
sample selection procedure. Section II presents our empirical tests of the factors that explain 
reacquisition activity. Section III compares firms that elect to distribute surplus cash by 
reacquiring their shares with firms with similar cash flow profiles that retain their temporary cash 
windfalls. Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Share Reacquisitions in the U.K. 
A. Institutional Features 
 The legal and regulatory environment governing open market share repurchases in the 
U.K. is very different to that in the U.S. Historically, U.K. firms were prohibited from purchasing 
their own ordinary shares. These restrictions were eased by the Companies Act 1981 and 
currently repurchases are regulated by a combination of the Companies Act 1985 and the Listing 
Rules of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Under these regulations, firms must obtain 
shareholder approval before repurchasing shares in the open market. Firms routinely seek and 
renew such authorisation each year at their Annual General Meeting, although such authority 
does not represent a binding commitment to make repurchases. Company Law restricts the 
number of shares that can be reacquired in the open market during a 12-month period to 15 
percent of the equity outstanding at the beginning of the period, although firm-specific 
authorisations often impose even tighter restrictions (e.g., 5 or 10 percent). Repurchases can only 
be funded out of distributable profits (or the proceeds of newly issued shares) and in contrast to 
the U.S. where repurchased shares are held as treasury stock for subsequent reissue, reacquired 
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 shares must be cancelled immediately in the U.K. Full details of all reacquisitions made during 
the fiscal year, including the total number of shares reacquired, the average price paid and 
aggregate cost, must be disclosed in firms’ published financial statements, together with the 
reason(s) for the repurchase (Companies Act 1985, Schedule 7, paras. 8 and 9). These rules 
ensure that precise measures of repurchase activity are readily available on an annual basis. 
 
B. Data 
We use mandated financial statement disclosures to identify the number and value of 
open market share reacquisitions made by U.K.-domiciled firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (exclusive of closed-end investment trusts). In the absence of machine-readable data on 
the volume and value of actual share reacquisitions, we employ a two-stage sampling procedure. 
First we identify an initial sample of potential repurchasers consisting of all firms with at least 
one share repurchase-related news event between January 1995 and December 2000. Repurchase 
news events are obtained from a variety of sources including the London Stock Exchange 
Regulatory News Service (RNS), the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), and The Financial 
Times.2 Our sample period begins in January 1995 because this is the earliest date that news 
announcements are available on the RNS database. After screening the initial set to remove non-
U.K.-domiciled firms, non-listed firms and closed-end investment trusts, we are left with a 
sample of 3,476 announcements for 456 firms. To this set we add all U.K.-domiciled firms in the 
Datastream alive and dead stocks files that report at least one negative value for item #1101 (Net 
Capital Issues) during our sample period but which are not included in our announcement sample. 
This procedure yields a further 32 firms, resulting in a final sample of 488 potential repurchasers.  
                                                 
2 We retain all firms with at least one news announcement regardless of the specific nature of the 
announcement. Announcements cover a spectrum of events including proposals to seek authority to 
repurchase shares at a forthcoming Annual or Extraordinary General Meeting; confirmation that repurchase 
authority has been granted at a recent General Meeting; plans to implement a specific buyback programme; 
plans to resume, continue with or extend an existing repurchase plan; and notification of actual share 
reacquisitions. 
 6
 In the second step of our sampling procedure, we examine published financial statements 
of all firms in the potential repurchaser sample to identify the aggregate number and value of 
actual share reacquisitions made in each fiscal year during our sample period, together with the 
reason(s) for the repurchase. Our final sample consists of 429 firm-year repurchases made by 251 
firms: 126 firms make reacquisitions in a single fiscal year, 85 firms make reacquisitions in two 
years and 40 firms make reacquisitions in three or more years. Our final sample of actual 
reacquirers is substantially smaller than the potential repurchaser sample because many firms that 
seek shareholder approval to repurchase their shares fail to exercise this authority. 
Table I presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports reacquisitions by 
value while Panel B reports the number of shares reacquired as a fraction of beginning-of-period 
shares outstanding. The aggregate value of shares reacquired during our sample window is almost 
£22 billion, with the average (median) deal worth £51 million (£3 million). The 12-month 
aggregate number of shares bought in the typical open market program is almost 5 percent of 
beginning-of-period shares outstanding. A striking feature of the data is the dramatic growth in 
reacquisition activity during the sample period. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) attribute part of this 
growth to changes in the way repurchases were taxed during the period. 
 
II. Share Reacquisitions and Surplus Cash 
A. Variables 
 With the exception of tests in which we model the probability of a share reacquisition, 
our primary measure of repurchase activity is the total value of shares reacquired in the open 
market in fiscal year t scaled by lagged total assets. We model the amount paid out to 
shareholders rather than the fraction of shares bought back because we believe that the cash 
magnitude of the payout is the key decision variable. However, our conclusions are not sensitive 
to this choice and we obtain similar results when we use the fraction of shares repurchased. 
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 We examine the drivers of repurchases using both stock and flow measures of cash. Our 
stock measure is total cash and cash equivalents. Our flow measures are cash from operating 
activities and cash from investing activities, constructed using data from the cash flow statement. 
All cash variables are scaled by total assets net of cash holdings. We also use a series of control 
variables drawn from previous share reacquisition models estimated by Dittmar (2000) and 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998). These include investment opportunities (the market-to-book 
ratio), underpricing (an indicator variable equal to one if 12-month market-adjusted stock returns 
are negative and zero otherwise), leverage (total current liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash 
divided by total assets net of cash), dividend payments (the dividend payout ratio), and firm size 
(the natural log of total assets). 
 
B. Industry-Level Analysis 
 We begin our analysis of the link between open market share reacquisitions and surplus 
cash by examining repurchase activity at the industry level. The surplus cash hypothesis predicts 
that share reacquisitions are used to distribute excess cash when investment opportunities are 
scarce. To the extent that the investment opportunity set is largely determined by the industry in 
which a firm operates (Smith and Watts (1992)), share reacquisitions should cluster in cash 
generative industries where investment opportunities are poor. The use of industry-level data 
provides potentially sharp tests of the relationship between reacquisitions and cash because the 
impact of other firm-level effects such as underpricing and leverage are likely to be diluted 
through the aggregation process. We explore the association between repurchases and cash in 
Table II by regressing the average value of share reacquisitions in industry k during calendar year 
t on cash holdings, cash flows, the market-to-book ratio, and a vector of control variables. 
Industry-years where the average market-to-book ratio falls below the cross-sectional median 
ratio are classified as having poor investment opportunities. The vector of control variables 
comprises measures of excess sector stock returns, firm size, the dividend payout ratio, and an 
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 indicator variable capturing the abolition of Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) in April 1999.3 All 
variables with the exception of the ACT dummy are industry-year means computed using data for 
all firms on the Datastream alive and dead stocks files. The model is estimated using all 
Datastream level-4 industry groups with available data. The initial sample consists of 225 
industry-year observations for calendar years 1995 through 2000. A number of our regression 
specifications also employ measures of cash flow from operating and investing activities. Because 
Datastream does not report these data for financial firms, the number of useable observations 
declines to 189 when these variables are used.4 
Regression summary statistics and coefficient estimates are reported in Table II. 
Although the estimated coefficient on the average cash holdings term is positive in model 1 as 
predicted by the surplus cash hypothesis, it is not significant. Cash holdings per se do not 
therefore appear to be a strong predictor of share repurchases at the industry level. In model 2, we 
add cash flow from operations (CFO) and cash flow from investing activities (CFI). The 
estimated coefficients on CFI and CFO are both positive, although only the latter is significant. 
The CFO coefficient is also more than three-and-a-half times larger than the CFI coefficient. (A 
partial F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the CFO and CFI coefficients are equal at the 1 
percent level.) The estimated coefficient on the cash holdings term doubles in magnitude and 
becomes significant at the 5 percent level. These results highlight the importance of controlling 
for the source of cash and suggest that both cash holdings and operating cash flows drive 
industry-level share reacquisition activity. 
                                                 
3 Prior to April 1999 the U.K. operated an imputation system of taxation. Under this system, open market 
share reacquisitions qualified as distributions for tax purposes and as such generated an ACT charge. In the 
absence of surplus ACT capacity against which to offset this charge, share reacquisitions generated an 
additional tax liability. Accordingly, open market reacquisitions were relatively unattractive to firms 
seeking to minimise their ACT liability. The abolition of ACT removed this obstacle, thereby increasing 
the attractiveness of repurchases as a distribution mechanism. 
4 As a check on the impact of excluding financial firms, we repeat the analysis using cash flow data 
supplied by Thomson Analytics (TA). In addition to providing cash flow data for U.K. non-financial firms, 
TA also reports operating and investing cash flow data for financial firms. The cash flow results using the 
TA data are uniformly stronger than those reported in Table II, suggesting that our conclusions are robust to 
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 Models 3 and 4 expand the basic regression to consider the intervening effect of 
investment opportunities on the link between share reacquisitions and surplus cash. The main 
effect cash variables in these two models capture the association between reacquisitions and cash 
in industries where investment opportunities are plentiful, while their associated interaction terms 
capture the marginal impact of cash in industries with poor investment opportunities. Results for 
both models indicate that cash holdings are unrelated to share reacquisitions in high market-to-
book industries. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on the Cash holdings × Low MB 
interaction terms are positive, statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and large in 
magnitude. The link between share repurchases and cash holdings appears to be confined to 
industry-years where investment opportunities are poor. A similar pattern is evident in model 4 
when operating cash flow is added to the regression: while the CFO main effect term is 
insignificant, the interaction with Low MB is positive, significant at the 5 percent level, and large 
in magnitude. Controlling for the impact of cash holdings, the incremental significance of the 
operating cash flow interaction term demonstrates the dynamic cash management role that 
repurchases play in the presence of operating cash windfalls and limited investment opportunities. 
The CFI main effect term in model 4 is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, 
consistent with the prediction that repurchases are used to distribute excess cash flows arising 
from nonoperating activities. Contrary to expectations, however, there is no evidence that this 
effect is stronger in (or restricted to) industries where investment opportunities are less plentiful. 
Our evidence that operating activities appear to be the primary source of cash used to 
fund share repurchases is consistent with Opler et al. (1999) who document that significant 
increases in excess cash tend to be driven by large swings in cash from operations. On the other 
hand, the fact that the average amount spent reacquiring shares appears more sensitive to CFO 
than CFI is inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that repurchases are primarily used to distribute 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial firms. We chose not to present results using the TA data in Table II, however, because TA restate 
published numbers to comply with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
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 transitory cash flow shocks and that such shocks are more likely to stem from nonoperating 
activities (Jagannathan et al. (2000)). Analysis of the relative levels of CFO and CFI offers one 
possible explanation for our result. While operating activities are associated with net cash inflows 
on average, nonoperating activities are characterised by net cash outflows.5 Accordingly, share 
reacquisition activity at the industry level is more sensitive to operating cash flows because 
operating activities are more likely to generate cash surpluses. 
Of the control variables Table II, firm size is consistently positive and significant at the 
10 percent level, indicating that the average amount spent on share reacquisitions is greater in 
industries populated by larger firms. The ACT indicator variable is also positive and marginally 
significant, supporting the prediction that the abolition of Advance Corporation Tax increased the 
attractiveness of share repurchases generally. Despite being statistically significant however, the 
estimated coefficients on both control variables are small relative to those on the cash variables, 
suggesting that the impact of firm size and tax is economically trivial relative to the cash effect. 
Overall, the industry-level analysis reported in this section reveals that share 
reacquisitions in the U.K. cluster in sectors where average cash holdings and cash flows are high 
and investment opportunities are scarce. The results, which hold even after controlling for 
dividend payout rates, strongly support both the surplus cash and financial flexibility hypotheses.  
 
C. Firm-Level Analysis 
To provide further evidence on the link between repurchases and surplus cash, we 
explore the determinants of share reacquisitions at the firm level. First we model the probability 
of a share reacquisition by comparing repurchasing firms with a matched sample of 
nonrepurchasers. Then we model the amount that reacquiring firms spend buying back their 
shares. 
                                                 
5 Mean (median) operating cash flow as a proportion of net total assets is 0.11 (0.12), compared with –0.11 
(-0.10) for cash flow from investing activities. 
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C.1. Reacquirers Versus Nonreacquirers 
In this section we use a matched-pairs design to examine the association between surplus 
cash and share reacquisitions, whereby each reacquiring firm-year observation is twinned with a 
time-, industry- and size-matched nonrepurchasing firm. To the extent that firms’ investment 
opportunities are largely determined by the conditions of the industry in which they operate, 
matching by industry group allows us to explore share reacquisition activity holding constant the 
investment opportunity set. Nonrepurchasers are classified as firms that did not reacquire shares 
during the five-year window centred on the repurchase year. Firms are matched at the Datastream 
level-6 industry level subject to the difference in total assets employed not exceeding ±25%, 
otherwise they are matched using the level-4 classification.  
Appropriate matching firms are unavailable in 27 cases, reducing the useable sample to 
402 matched-pairs.6 Of these, 314 (88) cases are matched with a control firm at industry level-6 
(level-4). Missing financial statement data further reduces the sample to 365 matched pairs. In 
addition, because operating and investing cash flow data are unavailable from Datastream for 
financial firms, the number of matched pairs declines to 268 when these variables are used. 
 The surplus cash and financial flexibility hypotheses predict that share reacquisitions 
facilitate the timely distribution of temporary excess cash flows. Figure 1 presents time-series 
plots of operating and investing cash flows for the repurchaser and nonrepurchaser samples 
relative to the reacquisition year. The patterns presented in Figure 1 support the view that 
repurchases are paid out of temporary cash flows. Operating cash flows peak in the year 
preceding the reacquisition before reverting back to normal levels. Share reacquisitions also 
coincide with a spike in nonoperating cash flows. The contemporaneous link between repurchases 
                                                 
6 Matching nonrepurchasers are unavailable when all remaining firms in the industry either announce a 
repurchase intention or execute a repurchase during the five-year period centred on the repurchase year. 
The 27 nonmatched cases are drawn exclusively from the utilities sector. Accordingly, our results may not 
be generalizable to firms operating in this sector. 
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 and nonoperating cash inflows suggests that share reacquisitions may play an important 
restructuring role by enabling management to disgorge disposal proceeds in a timely manner. 
 We use a conditional logistic model to relate the probability of an open market share 
reacquisition to measures of cash and a series of control variables. The conditional logistic model 
is the appropriate method for matched pairs data (Breslow, 1982). The method involves fitting a 
standard logistic regression to a constant response, where the model has no intercept and all 
explanatory variables are defined as the difference between each case–control matched pair. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable takes a value of one for each matched pair i = 1, … n, while 
all explanatory variables are computed as the difference between the ith pairwise combination. 
The set of control variables includes proxies for investment opportunities, underpricing, net 
leverage and dividends. EPS growth is also included following evidence reported by Brav et al. 
(2003) that many U.S. firms cite the desire to increase earnings per share (EPS) among their list 
of repurchase reasons. Finally, firm size is included to control for any residual size differences not 
captured by our matching procedure.7 All variables are measured at the beginning of the 
reacquisition year. 
 Table III presents estimates of conditional logistic models explaining the likelihood of an 
open market share reacquisition. The results provide further evidence of a link between 
repurchases and surplus cash. Model 1 indicates that repurchasers are characterised by higher 
cash holdings relative to similar sized nonrepurchasing firms operating in the same sector. 
However, the magnitude and significance of the cash holdings coefficient declines in model 2 
when the regression is extended to include cash from operating and investing activities, 
suggesting that surplus cash flow, rather than accumulated cash holdings, drives firm-level 
reacquisition activity. Both operating and investing cash flows are significantly higher for 
reacquiring firms. The significance of the CFI term is consistent with the hypothesis that share 
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 reacquisitions are used to distribute nonoperating cash inflows. However, the magnitude of the 
CFI coefficient is less than half that on the CFO term. A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the CFO and CFI coefficients are equal at the 1 percent level. An increase in operating cash flows 
from the first to the third quartile results in a 43 percent ([0.778 – 0.546] / 0.546) rise in the 
implied probability of a repurchase. This compares with only a 12 percent increase in repurchase 
probability for a corresponding change in nonoperating cash flows. These findings mirror our 
industry-level results in that repurchase activity appears to be particularly sensitive to operating 
cash flow shocks.8 
 Models 1 and 2 in Table III also indicate statistically significant associations between the 
probability of a share reacquisition and several of our control variables. The positive coefficient 
estimate on the underpricing proxy indicates that reacquirers are more likely to experience 
negative market-adjusted returns over the 12-month period preceding the reacquisition year. 
These findings support the prediction that firms repurchase shares in response to perceived 
undervaluation. Reacquirers are also characterised by lower net leverage. One interpretation of 
this result is that firms use share reacquisitions to manage their capital structure when leverage 
ratios fall below target (Dittmar (2000)). An alternative possibility is that concern over the 
increased risk of financial distress prevents already highly levered firms from reacquiring their 
shares. Despite our matching procedure, reacquirers are significantly larger than their 
nonrepurchaser counterparts. Firms that undertake open market share reacquisitions are also 
associated with significantly higher earnings per share growth. However, analysis of the implied 
probabilities presented in Table III reveals that, with the exception of net leverage, the economic 
impact of these factors is small compared with the cash flow effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 We do not consider the use of open market share reacquisitions as a takeover defence mechanism because, 
as Allen and Michaely (2002) discuss, such effects are likely to be restricted to self-tender offers in which a 
large fraction of shares are bought over a short period. 
8 In additional (untabulated) tests, we follow the approach in Table II and interact each of the cash variables 
with the Low MB indicator variable. None of the resulting interaction terms are significant at conventional 
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  The results presented in this section demonstrate a strong statistical and economic link 
between the probability of a share reacquisition and temporary excess cash flow, holding constant 
the investment opportunity set. In the following section, we test whether, in addition to affecting 
the likelihood of a repurchase, cash flow performance also influences the amount spent 
reacquiring shares. 
 
C.2. The Value of Share Reacquisitions 
In this section we model the aggregate annual spend on open market share reacquisitions 
for firms that undertook at least one repurchase during our sample period. The amount spent is an 
important dimension of the payout decision ignored by our matched-pairs tests. Further, to the 
extent that each reacquiring firm serves as its own control, this approach helps overcome the 
correlated omitted variable problem that can render the results of matched-pair tests potentially 
difficult to interpret. We start by constructing an unbalanced panel based on our sample of 251 
repurchasing firms, comprising all firm-years with available data during the sample period 
(regardless of whether or not a repurchase occurred in a given year). The resulting panel consists 
of 1,333 firm-year observations with available financial statement and market data, of which 393 
(32%) are repurchase years. Because Datastream does not report cash flow data for financial 
firms, the number of useable observations declines to 1,033 when these variables are used. 
We use OLS regression to model the value of share reacquisitions. The dependent 
variable is equal to zero for firm-years in which no shares are acquired; otherwise it equals the 
aggregate cost of shares reacquired during fiscal year t scaled by lagged total assets. Because the 
amount spent on repurchases is lower bounded at zero, we apply a logarithmic transformation to 
the resulting measure to limit the risk of specification bias.9 The primary explanatory variables of 
                                                                                                                                                 
levels. The absence of any interaction effect is consistent with our matched-pairs design controlling for 
industry-level differences in the investment opportunity set. 
9 To avoid generating missing observations in years where no shares are repurchased, zero values are 
replaced with 10-9. We do not present results using a tobit specification because the amount spent on 
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 interest are our measures of cash holdings, cash flow from operations, and cash flow from 
investing activities. In addition, the model also includes proxies for investment opportunities, 
underpricing, leverage (benchmarked against the industry median), dividend payments, and EPS 
growth. We also include an indicator variable proxying for the existence of distributable reserves 
because under U.K. company law, the maximum payout cannot exceed the value of distributable 
reserves. This variable takes the value of one if lagged total shareholder reserves are positive and 
zero otherwise. Similar to our industry-level tests in Table II, we also include an indicator 
variable to control for structural shifts in the level of share reacquisition activity resulting from 
the abolition of ACT. 
 Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions explaining the amount 
spent on share reacquisitions are reported in Table IV. Results for the cash variables in models 1 
and 2 follow a similar pattern to those documented in Table III. In particular, while the cash 
holdings term is positive and significant in model 1, extending the model to include the two cash 
flow measures highlights surplus cash flows, rather than accumulated cash holdings, as the 
primary driver of the amount spent reacquiring shares. Also consistent with previous findings, the 
amount paid out is more sensitive to operating cash flows than to cash flows from investing 
activities. The null hypothesis that the operating and investing cash flow coefficients are 
equivalent is rejected at the 5 percent level using a partial F-test. Consistent with results reported 
in Table III, spending on share reacquisitions is positively related to underpricing and negatively 
associated with net gearing. Of the remaining controls variables, only ACT is consistently 
significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
 The final two columns in Table IV report results for single and multiple reacquirers 
separately. The magnitude of the repurchase spend is positively associated with operating cash 
flow for both groups. In contrast, the significance of cash flow from investing activities is 
                                                                                                                                                 
repurchases is a bounded rather than a censured variable. However, untabulated results using a tobit 
estimation are entirely consistent with those reported in Table IV. 
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 restricted to firms that repurchase shares in two or more years. Precisely why the association 
between reacquisition payouts and investing cash flows is restricted to multiple repurchasers is 
unclear. One possibility is that firms with large disposal proceeds are unable to confine payouts to 
a single reporting period because of restrictions on the fraction of shares that can be repurchased 
in a given year. 
 
D. Summary 
  Summarizing the results presented in this section, we find strong evidence that U.K. firms 
use share reacquisitions to pay out temporary cash surpluses. Repurchase activity appears to 
cluster in cash-rich industries characterized by poor investment opportunities. At the firm level, 
both the probability and value of a repurchase are positively related to cash flow performance. 
Cash from operating activities, and to a lesser extent cash from investing activities, emerge as the 
primary drivers of share repurchase activity. To the extent that firms appear to use repurchases to 
pay out transitory cash surpluses in a timely fashion, these findings support both the surplus cash 
and financial flexibility hypotheses. 
 
III. Agency Problems and Share Reacquisitions 
While the results reported in the previous section pinpoint abnormally high transitory 
cash inflows as a key determinant of share reacquisitions in the U.K., they fail to shed light on 
what drives firms to distribute such surpluses in the first place. In an effort to fully understand the 
link between share reacquisitions and surplus cash, we go one step further in this section and 
explore the reasons why some firms elect to distribute transitory excess cash (via a share 
repurchase) while others do not. In particular, we examine the link between the agency costs of 
managerial discretion and the payout decision by testing whether the severity of the agency 
problem between insiders and outsiders affects the likelihood that temporary cash flow windfalls 
are paid out through a repurchase. We compare the governance characteristics of repurchasing 
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 firms to those of similar cash-flow-profile nonrepurchasing firms. If the decision to distribute 
surplus cash is conditional on the absence of serious agency problems between insiders and 
outsiders, repurchasing firms should be characterised by superior governance arrangements at the 
time of the reacquisition. We supplement these cross-sectional tests with evidence on the relative 
performance of repurchasing and nonrepurchasing firms in the postrepurchase period. We begin 
by examining postrepurchase operating performance. If repurchasing firms face lower agency 
costs of managerial discretion then, all else equal, they should be associated with superior 
operating performance improvements in the postrepurchase period. Next we compare relative 
takeover and failure rates for repurchaser and nonrepurchaser firms in the postrepurchase period. 
To the extent that increased stock market pressure substitutes for weak internal governance 
arrangements (Shivdasani (1993)), evidence that repurchasing firms face fewer agency problems 
should be reflected in a lower probability of disciplinary takeover pressure in the postrepurchase 
period. More generally, if repurchasing firms are characterized by lower agency costs of 
managerial discretion then they should be associated with lower failure rates in the 
postrepurchase period. 
We explore the impact of agency problems on the decision to use open market share 
reacquisitions to distribute transitory cash inflows by comparing firms whose repurchases are 
most likely to be motivated by a desire to distribute surplus cash with similar firms that 
experience comparable cash flow windfalls but that elect not to distribute these funds through a 
repurchase (or any other method). A matched-pairs design based on surplus cash repurchasers 
serves to increase the power of our tests, as well as making the task of collecting governance data 
more manageable. (Machine-readable governance data are not available in the U.K. and as result 
all data must be manually extracted from firms’ published financial statements.) The following 




 A. Identifying Firms with Transitory Cash Surpluses 
Schedule 7 of the Companies Act 1985 requires firms to disclose in their published 
annual report and accounts the reason(s) for any share reacquisitions made during the accounting 
period. We use these disclosures to identify surplus cash-driven repurchases. From our initial 
sample of 429 repurchaser firm-years, we retain all cases where management cited distributing 
surplus cash (including disposal proceeds) or increasing balance sheet efficiency among their list 
of repurchase reasons. The final sample consists of 132 firm-year observations.10 
Each surplus cash repurchaser is then matched with a firm that experienced a similar 
spike in cash flow performance but chose not to increase payouts to shareholders. Matching is 
performed on the basis of industry (Datastream level-4), cash flow, and size (total assets net of 
cash holdings) at the beginning of the repurchase year. We use a sequential sort procedure 
whereby nonrepurchasers are ranked within their industry group first by cash flow performance 
and then by size.11 Results reported in Section II highlight cash from operations as the main cash-
related driver of open market share reacquisitions. We therefore use CFO (scaled by lagged total 
assets net of cash) as our primary cash flow measure for matching purposes. However, for 
observations where CFO is either < 0 (n = 8) or < CFI (n = 7), we match on the basis of CFI 
(where CFI > 0) on the assumption that surplus cash is more likely to result from nonoperating 
activities in such cases. We discard 7 cases where both CFO and CFI are negative. A further 8 
cases are excluded because of missing data. Finally, 11 cases (all utility firms) are excluded 
because of the lack of nonrepurchasing firms in the same sector. Our final sample therefore 
consists of 106 high cash flow matched pairs. 
                                                 
10 In many cases, mandated disclosures provide only limited insights into the decision to reacquire shares. 
For example, 34 percent of our sample fail to provide any clear indication for buybacks beyond a bland 
statement that share reacquisitions are earnings enhancing, while a similar fraction cite increasing earnings 
per share (EPS) as the primary motive driving the repurchase.  
11 As discussed in Section II.B, Datastream does not carry operating and investing cash flow data for 
financial firms. Rather than remove these firms and erode our already small sample even further, we use 
cash flow data supplied by Thomson Analytics for the purpose of matching financial firms.  
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 Figure 2 plots scaled operating cash flows for the repurchaser and nonrepurchaser 
samples over the period t – 2 to t + 1 (where t is the repurchase year). The results suggest that our 
sampling procedure has succeeded in isolating firms with high temporary cash flows. Operating 
cash flows peak in year t – 1 for both groups. In addition, both samples display high operating 
cash flow performance relative to the industry norm. (Mean and median industry-adjusted scaled 
CFO are significantly positive for both groups at the 1 percent level.) Note, however, that average 
operating cash flows for the repurchaser sample still exceed those of the control sample despite 
our matching procedure. This is further evidence that repurchasing firms tend be among the 
highest cash flow performers in their industry. 
 
B. Governance Characteristics and the Likelihood of a Share Repurchase 
We begin our exploration of the impact of agency problems on the repurchase payout 
decision by testing whether the governance arrangements of surplus cash repurchasers differ 
systematically from those of their nonrepurchasing counterparts (after controlling for other 
determinants of cash holdings). We use ownership structure and board monitoring (measured at 
the beginning of year t) to proxy for the degree of agency problems between insiders and 
outsiders. Board stock ownership is the aggregate percentage of common equity held by all board 
members. To ensure that we fully capture managerial stock incentives, we also include a measure 
of stock-based compensation, defined as the ratio of directors’ outstanding options and LTIP 
grants to total shares outstanding. Agency problems may also be a function of external ownership 
structure (Holderness (2003)). We therefore employ two external ownership measures: the largest 
external ownership blockholding and the sum of all identifiable institutional ownership stakes. 
The board of directors represents the apex of the internal control mechanism for publicly 
traded firms (Fama and Jensen (1983)). We use several proxies to capture the degree of board 
monitoring. Yermack (1996) finds that larger boards are associated with weaker monitoring. 
Board size is measured as the number of board members. A large body of research indicates that 
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 board monitoring is positively related to the proportion of independent directors (Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003)). The fraction of independent outside directors is defined as the number of 
board members with no business or family ties to the firm scaled by total board size. We use two 
proxies to measure the level of board dominance. Founder is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one if the founder, co-founder, a founder-descendant is a current board member and zero 
otherwise. Dominant decision-maker is an indicator variable equal to one if the board contains 
either the founder or a combined Chairman and CEO and zero otherwise. We also use board 
tenure to reflect the likelihood that internal monitoring weakens as board service lengthens. 
Tenure is the years of board service for the median director. Finally, following Shivdasani (1993) 
we use the number of additional directorships in other LSE-listed firms held by the median board 
member as a proxy for director quality. 
Table V Panel A reports summary financial data (measured at the beginning of the 
reacquisition year) for repurchasing and nonrepurchasing firms. Consistent with the results 
presented in Figure 2, repurchasers are characterized by significantly higher operating cash flows. 
Median investing cash flows are also higher (less negative) for the repurchaser group. In contrast, 
aggregate cash holdings for the two samples are equivalent. The mean dividend payout ratio for 
the two groups is also similar, while the median payout ratio is marginally higher for the 
repurchaser sample. Consistent with results reported in Section II.C, repurchasers display poorer 
stock market performance in the prerepurchase period. 
Lower costs of cash shortfalls or external financing (as reflected in fewer growth 
opportunities, lower R&D expenditures, higher net working capital and larger firm size) might 
explain why repurchasing firms elect to distribute transitory cash surpluses (Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003), Dittmar et al. (2003), Opler et al. (1999)). However, results presented in Panel A 
provide little support for this view. The average market-to-book ratio for the repurchase sample is 
indistinguishable from that of the nonrepurchase sample while contrary to predictions, the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total assets is significantly higher. The level of net working capital is also 
 21
 similar for the two samples. However, despite our attempt to control for firm size as part of the 
sample selection procedure, repurchasers are nevertheless significantly larger than their 
nonrepurchasing counterparts. This is consistent with the claim that larger firms payout more cash 
because they face lower costs of raising funds externally. 
 Panel B reports summary statistics for our agency cost variables. Compared to 
repurchasers, high cash flow nonrepurchasing firms are associated with significantly lower levels 
of insider stock ownership. Mean (median) insider ownership for the repurchaser sample is 7.5 
(0.3) percent, compared with 14.0 (4.3) percent for the nonrepurchase sample. Nonrepurchasers 
appear to fall in the mid-range of the insider ownership distribution where evidence reported by 
Morck et al. (1988) suggests that managerial entrenchment problems are likely to be most acute. 
Greater managerial entrenchment resulting from higher board ownership in nonrepurchasing 
firms is to some extent offset by significantly larger external ownership stakes. However, the 
overall magnitude of such stakes appears to be economically similar in both samples at around 25 
percent. 
Also consistent with an entrenchment story, nonrepurchasing firms are associated with 
smaller boards, a higher incidence of founder board membership, and a lower fraction of 
independent outside directors (although in the latter case the significance level is marginal). 
Further, at the director level there is weak evidence that the median board member in the 
repurchaser sample holds a higher number board seats in other LSE-listed firms. Taken together, 
these summary statistics suggest that repurchasers have less entrenched management teams 
relative to nonrepurchasing firms with similar cash flow profiles. The findings are consistent with 
outside shareholders facing higher agency problems insofar as they are less able to force 
entrenched managers to disgorge transitory cash surpluses in a timely manner.  
To test whether our univariate evidence is robust to other observed differences between 
the repurchaser and nonrepurchaser samples, we estimate conditional logistic regressions relating 
the probability of a repurchase to measures of agency problems and a series of additional control 
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 variables. To the extent that many of our agency variables are highly correlated with one another, 
this multivariate approach also allows us to test which specific aspects of control matter most. 
Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for the conditional logistic models are reported in 
Table VI. Models 1 and 2 include only the governance variables. The probability of a repurchase 
is negatively associated with the level of insider stock ownership in both models. In addition to 
being statistically significant, the insider ownership effect is also economically important. For 
example, a reduction in the level of insider ownership from the third to the first quartile increases 
the probability of a repurchase by 40 percent in model 1 and 37 percent in model 2. Model 1 
indicates that the presence of a founder on the board also significantly reduces the probability of a 
repurchase. However, examination of the associated implied probabilities suggests that the 
economic impact of founders is small. In model 2, we replace founder with a broader measure of 
board dominance that takes the value of one if the board contains either the founder or a 
combined Chairman and CEO and zero otherwise. This variable fails to attain significance at 
conventional levels, suggesting that it is the specific presence of a founder (rather than a 
dominant board decision-maker more generally) that affects the probability that transitory cash 
surpluses are distributed via a repurchase. Of the remaining governance variables in models 1 and 
2, none achieve significance at the 10 percent level or better. Similar results are evident in models 
3 and 4 when the regression is extended to include controls for cash flows, cash holdings, firm 
size, dividend payout, R&D expenditure, underpricing and leverage. Contrary to model 1, 
however, founder status is no longer significant at the 10 percent level in model 3. 
 Overall, the results reported in Tables V and VI suggest that the decision to pay out 
transitory cash surpluses by repurchasing shares is a function of the level of managerial 
entrenchment. As such, these findings suggest that while share reacquisitions may provide firms 
with a flexible mechanism for distributing transitory excess cash, the extent to which this payout 
option is utilised is conditional (at least in part) on the absence of serious agency problems 
between inside and outside shareholders.  
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C. Postrepurchase performance 
In this section we conduct supplementary tests of the association between surplus cash-
motivated share reacquisitions and agency problems by comparing the relative performance of 
repurchases and nonrepurchasers in the two-year period following the repurchase year. We begin 
by testing for evidence of abnormal operating performance improvements among repurchasing 
firms. Then we test whether repurchasers are less likely to fail or be the subject of a corporate 
control contest. 
 
C.1. Operating Performance 
 If distributing transitory cash surpluses via a share reacquisition reflects lower agency 
costs of managerial discretion, then we should expect to observe systematic differences in 
operating performance between high cash flow repurchasers and comparable nonrepurchasers in 
the postrepurchase period. We test for evidence of postrepurchase abnormal operating 
performance improvements using a version of the test developed by Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1992) and later employed by Harford (1999). Specifically, we regress the difference in 
postrepurchase operating performance for the ith repurchaser-nonrepurchaser matched pair on the 
corresponding pairwise difference in prerepurchase operating performance: 
PostiPrei,Posti, eeperformanc Operatingbb  eperformanc Operating ,10 ++=  (1) 
The regression uses all matched pairs with data for both the pre- and postrepurchase periods. The 
b1 coefficient in regression (1) captures the continuation of any differential prerepurchase 
performance for repurchasing firms while the b0 coefficient captures any abnormal performance 
improvements for these firms between the prerepurchase and postrepurchase periods. A 
significantly positive estimate for b0 would therefore provide evidence that repurchasing firms 
experienced abnormal operating performance improvements in the postrepurchase period. 
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 Regression (1) is estimated using two measures of operating performance: operating cash flow 
and operating profit, both scaled by total assets net of cash. The prerepurchase period is defined 
as year t – 1. We run separate versions of regression (1) for postrepurchase operating performance 
measured in years t + 1 and t + 2. 
Table VII presents the results of estimating regression (1). The positive estimates 
reported in Panel A for b1 indicate that the superior prerepurchase operating performance for 
repurchasing firms documented in Tables V and VI persists through year t + 1. More importantly, 
the b0 coefficient is also positive and significant (at the 5 percent level), indicating that 
repurchasing firms experience significant abnormal operating performance improvements in year 
t + 1. The estimated effect, which is evident for both operating cash flow and operating profit, is 
also economically significant at between two and three percentage points. The intercepts are also 
positive in Panel B where postrepurchase performance is measured in year t + 2. However, only 
the operating cash flow effect is significant (at the 10 percent level), indicating that abnormal 
profitability improvements are largely confined to year t + 1.  
The evidence that firms which elect to distribute transitory cash surpluses through share 
repurchases are associated with short-run improvements in postrepurchase abnormal operating 
performance supports the view that these firms face lower agency costs of managerial discretion.  
 
C.2. Corporate Control and Failure Probabilities 
 To further test whether the decision to use share repurchases to distribute temporary 
excess cash flows is a function of agency problems, we model the probability that high transitory 
cash flow firms either receive a formal takeover bid or cease to exist as an independent stock 
exchange entity in the two-year postrepurchase period. All else equal, we expect lower agency 
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 costs of managerial discretion among repurchasing firms to be reflected in a lower probability of 
disciplinary market pressure and outright failure in the period following the repurchase.12  
We classify firms as being subject to disciplinary market pressure if they receive at least 
one formal takeover bid or merger proposal during the two-year postrepurchase period. 
Announcements of corporate control events are identified through a keyword search of the 
Factiva news service. We then estimate a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is 
equal to one if the firm received a formal bid and zero otherwise. The linear predictor consists of 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a repurchaser and zero otherwise, 
plus a vector of control variables drawn from the prior acquisition literature. Control variables 
include firm size, market-to-book, leverage, abnormal stock returns, board stock ownership, the 
presence of a founder on the board, the fraction of board members who are independent of 
management, and the presence of a significant external blockholder (defined as ≥ ten percent of 
shares outstanding). 
Firms are classified as having failed if they are no longer contained in the Datastream list 
of active stocks at the end of the two-year postrepurchase period. Failure to survive as an 
independent listed entity can occur for a variety of reasons including suspension of shares, 
takeover or merger, management buyout, and liquidation. Similar to the approach used to model 
the probability of a takeover bid, we estimate a logistic regression in which the dependent 
variable equals one if the firm failed during the postrepurchase period and zero otherwise. The set 
of explanatory variables is the same as that used in the takeover model.  
                                                 
12 If firms use repurchases as a means of defending themselves against possible takeover threats (Dittmar 
(2000)), then we would expect to observe a lower frequency of postrepurchase corporate control contests 
among the repurchase sample by construction (rather than because of lower agency costs of managerial 
discretion). As argued by Allen and Michaely (2002), however, the takeover defence role of share 
repurchases is likely to be restricted to self-tender offers. Consistent with this view, none of our sample 
firms cite takeover-related motives among their list of repurchase reasons. Note also that if open market 
repurchases are used as a defence mechanism, this should bias against our second prediction that 
repurchasing firms will be more likely to survive to the end of the postrepurchase period as an independent 
exchange-listed entity. 
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  Results reported in Table VIII provide support for the prediction that repurchasing firms 
face fewer agency problems than their nonrepurchaser counterparts. In the takeover model 
presented in column 2, the repurchaser indicator variable is negative and significant (at the 6 
percent level). Firms that distribute temporary cash surpluses by repurchasing shares are 
significantly less likely than comparable nonrepurchasing firms to become takeover targets in the 
two-year postrepurchase period. Consistent with prior research, larger firms and those with high 
board stock ownership are also less likely to be targeted in a takeover bid. The estimated 
coefficient on the repurchaser indicator variable is also negative and significant (at the 2 percent 
level) in the failure model presented in column 3. Compared with similar cash-flow-profile firms 
that elect not to distribute, repurchasers are less likely to fail in the postrepurchase period. Small 
firms, highly geared firms, and firms with low levels of board stock ownership are also 
significantly more likely to fail.  
In addition to being statistically significant, the magnitude of the association between the 
repurchase decision and the subsequent probability of takeover and failure is economically 
meaningful. The implied probability of a takeover bid is 41% lower for repurchasing firms, while 
the probability of outright failure declines by 56% for firms that use share reacquisitions to 
distribute their transitory cash surpluses (holding all remaining explanatory variables constant at 
their mean values). 
 
D. Summary 
Overall, the tests presented in this section provide consistent support for the prediction 
that the decision to distribute temporary excess cash flow via a share repurchase is conditional on 
the magnitude of agency problems between insiders and outsiders. Repurchasing firms that 
unambiguously use share reacquisitions to disgorge surplus cash have less entrenched 
management teams (at the time of the repurchase), display superior improvements in 
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 postrepurchase operating performance, and are less likely to either fail or be targeted in a 
corporate control contest during the two-year period following the payout decision. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
While considerable attention has been paid in the finance literature to modelling the 
direct association between share reacquisitions and surplus cash, surprising little consideration 
has been given to the factors that motive firms with excess cash to pay it out. In this paper, we 
examine the extent to which firms use share reacquisitions as a means of distributing temporary 
cash flow windfalls and test whether agency problems between managers and external 
shareholders affect the payout decision. Our analysis focuses on actual share reacquisitions made 
by U.K. firms and exploits features of the regulatory environment that require firms to disclose 
both the precise number and value of shares repurchased, as well as the reason(s) underlying the 
repurchase decision. 
We begin by examining the determinants of share reacquisitions using a comprehensive 
panel of repurchases made between 1995 and 2000. We find that corporate liquidity, and in 
particular operating cash flow performance, is the dominant factor driving repurchase activity. 
Other factors such as underpricing and gearing, while statistically significant, are economically 
less important. At the industry level, share repurchases cluster in industries with high operating 
cash flows and poor investment opportunities. Holding investment opportunities constant at the 
firm level, we find that both the probability and value of a repurchase are strongly associated with 
operating (and to a lesser extent investing) cash flows. Controlling for cash flow performance, the 
level of cash holdings does not appear to impact on the repurchase decision. Our evidence 
strongly supports both the surplus cash and financial flexibility explanations for why firms 
repurchase their shares. 
The presence of temporary cash windfalls is not automatically expected to trigger a 
repurchase however. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the corporate landscape is littered with 
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 cases where management have elected to either retain such surpluses or use them to fund value-
destroying expansion and diversification strategies. We therefore proceed by asking the question: 
what factors distinguish firms that disgorge transitory cash windfalls (through a share repurchase) 
from comparable firms that do not? One possibility is that repurchasing firms face lower agency 
costs of managerial discretion. We explore this issue by isolating a subset of repurchasing firms 
where the payout decision is clearly driven by a desire to distribute surplus cash. We then 
compare these firms to a set of nonrepurchasing firms with similar cash flow profiles. Neither 
growth opportunities nor the costs of external financing can explain the difference in payout 
strategy for these two groups. Instead, we find that governance characteristics discriminate 
between firms that choose to payout transitory cash surpluses and those that do not. In particular, 
repurchasing firms are associated with significantly lower levels of board stock ownership. Our 
findings suggest that in the presence of transitory cash surpluses, the decision whether or not to 
distribute these funds by reacquiring shares is a function of the agency costs of managerial 
entrenchment. As further evidence of the impact of agency problems, we find that repurchasers 
display significantly higher improvements in postrepurchase operating performance, and are less 
likely to fail or be targeted in a corporate control contest during the two-year period following the 
payout decision. Our results support the view that while repurchases represent a flexible tool for 
distributing transitory cash surpluses, agency problems between inside and outside shareholders 
can severely hinder their use for this purpose. 
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 Table I 
Summary Statistics for Share Reacquisition Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics for open market share reacquisitions made by U.K.-
domiciled firms between January 1995 and December 2000. The sample is drawn from all firms 
with at least one repurchase announcement reported by either the London Stock Exchange 
Regulatory News Service, the Securities Data Corporation, or The Financial Times during the 
sample period, plus all remaining firms in the Datastream alive and dead stocks files with at least 
one negative value for item #1101 (Net Capital Issues) during the same period. Published 
financial statements for each firm in the potential repurchaser sample are then examined to 
identify the aggregate number and cost of share reacquisitions made in each fiscal year during our 
sample period. The final sample consists of 429 firm-year observations. Panel A reports the cost 
of shares reacquired during fiscal year t. Panel B reports the number of ordinary shares reacquired 
during fiscal year t as a fraction of total ordinary shares outstanding at the beginning of year t. 
Panel A: Value of shares reacquired (£ million) 
Year N   Mean   St. dev   Q3 Median     Q1 Sum 
1995 26 40.319 103.407 35.300 1.254 0.275 1048.300
1996 42 63.446 156.308 21.235 2.238 0.227 2664.730
1997 49 53.646 116.070 25.400 3.068 0.441 2628.650
1998 87 35.219 108.705 11.701 2.000 0.648 3064.090
1999 105 43.648 144.412 15.300 2.600 0.704 4583.080
2000 120 65.321 205.770 30.908 3.951 1.1695 7838.540
All 429 50.880  154.385 21.000 2.675 0.648 21827.386
Panel B: Fraction of outstanding shares reacquired 
1995 26 0.045 0.041 0.079 0.032 0.011  
1996 42 0.052 0.042 0.079 0.048 0.017  
1997 49 0.046 0.058 0.055 0.028 0.010  
1998 87 0.038 0.036 0.050 0.025 0.013  
1999 105 0.047 0.053 0.060 0.029 0.014  
2000 120 0.057 0.062 0.077 0.040 0.014  
All 429 0.048 0.052 0.064 0.031 0.013  
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 Table II 
Industry-Level Share Reacquisition Activity 
This table presents summary statistics for OLS regressions explaining the average amount spent 
on share reacquisitions by firms in industry k during calendar year t. The regressions are 
estimated using all Datastream level-4 industry groups with available data. Industry-year averages 
are computed using all available firms on the Datastream alive and dead stocks files. Cash 
holdings, operating cash flow, and cash flow from investing activities are scaled by total assets 
net of cash. The cash variables are interacted with the Low MB indicator variable, which equals 1 
for industry-years where the average market-to-book ratio falls below the pooled cross-sectional 
median market to book ratio and 0 otherwise. The market-to-book ratio equals the market value 
of equity plus the book values of preference dividends and long-term debt divided by net total 
assets. The Low MB dummy indicates industries with poor investment opportunities. 
Underpricing is an indicator variable equal to 1 if average 12-month share returns for the firms in 
industry k < the market return and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of average total 
assets. Dividend payout is the average industry payout ratio. ACT is equal to 1 for calendar years 
1999 and 2000 and 0 otherwise. All variables other than ACT are measured at the beginning of 
the reacquisition year. Reported coefficients equal estimated coefficients multiplied by 102. Two-
tailed probability values calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -5.800 -15.890 -5.610 -7.980 
 (0.129) (0.030) (0.119) (0.026) 
Low MB 1.130 1.560 -2.670 -11.310 
 (0.113) (0.069) (0.070) (0.001) 
Cash holdings 10.340 26.060 -0.731 1.500 
 (0.130) (0.026) (0.811) (0.759) 
Cash from operations  29.320  0.847 
  (0.031)  (0.859) 
Cash from investing activities  8.870  11.600 
  (0.135)  (0.008) 
Low MB × Cash holdings   33.190 46.470 
   (0.045) (0.010) 
Low MB × Cash from operations    59.280 
    (0.008) 
Low MB × Cash from investing activities    -7.580 
    (0.295) 
Underpricing 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005 
 (0.550) (0.862) (0.375) (0.750) 
Size 0.474 1.000 0.596 0.899 
 (0.070) (0.020) (0.048) (0.003) 
Dividend payout -0.121 -0.007 -0.080 0.151 
 (0.011) (0.913) (0.129) (0.493) 
ACT 1.080 1.310 1.190 1.350 
 (0.129) (0.095) (0.098) (0.050) 
Adj-R2 0.0353 0.217 0.0707 0.3508 
F 2.37 7.51 3.44 10.23 
N 225 189 225 189 
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 Table III 
The Probability of a Share Reacquisition 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for conditional logistic 
regressions relating the probability of a share reacquisition to measures of cash and a vector of 
control variables. Repurchasing firms are matched with a similar nonrepurchasing firm on the 
basis of year, industry and size. The dependent variable takes the value of one for each matched 
pair i = 1…n while all explanatory variables are defined as the difference between the ith matched 
pair. Cash holdings, operating cash flow, and cash flow from investing activities are scaled by 
total assets net of cash. Low MB is a dummy variable equal 1 for if the market to book ratio < the 
industry-year median value and 0 otherwise. The market to book ratio equals the market value of 
equity plus the book values of preference dividends and long-term debt divided by net total 
assets. Underpricing is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 12-month market-adjusted share 
return < 0 and 0 otherwise. Net leverage is total current liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash 
divided by total assets net of cash. Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends per share to earnings 
per share. EPS growth is the change in earnings per share scaled by lagged earnings per share. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. All variables are measured at the beginning of the 
repurchase year. Two-tailed probability values are reported in parentheses. Predicted probabilities 
are the implied probability of a repurchase computed at the first and third quartiles of the chosen 
variable’s distribution (with all remaining variables in the model set equal to their sample means). 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Cash holdings 0.743 0.282 
 (0.051) (0.472) 
Cash from operations   7.149 
  (0.001) 
Cash from investing activities   3.040 
  (0.003) 
Low MB 0.201 0.534 
 (0.211) (0.021) 
Underpricing 0.463 0.481 
 (0.008) (0.051) 
Net leverage -0.407 -0.502 
 (0.025) (0.045) 
Dividend payout ratio 0.038 0.051 
 (0.024) (0.066) 
EPS growth -0.050 -0.038 
 (0.233) (0.397) 
Size 0.696 1.840 
 (0.011) (0.004) 
χ2 35.954 93.651 
p-value 0.001 0.001 
N 365 268 
 Predicted probability of making a repurchase for top and bottom quartiles 
Cash holdings   
 Top quartile 0.572 0.690 
 Bottom quartile 0.541 0.680 
Cash from operations   
 Top quartile  0.778 
 Bottom quartile  0.546 
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 Table III continued 
Cash from investing activities   
 Top quartile  0.719 
 Bottom quartile  0.642 
Low M/B   
 Top quartile 0.606 0.787 
 Bottom quartile 0.533 0.624 
Underpricing   
 Top quartile 0.549 0.677 
 Bottom quartile 0.549 0.677 
Net leverage   
 Top quartile 0.545 0.671 
 Bottom quartile 0.643 0.771 
Dividend payout   
 Top quartile 0.551 0.681 
 Bottom quartile 0.557 0.685 
EPS growth   
 Top quartile 0.555 0.682 
 Bottom quartile 0.542 0.666 
Size   
 Top quartile 0.562 0.695 
 Bottom quartile 0.534 0.627 
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 Table IV 
Spending on Share Reacquisitions 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions of 
that amount spent reacquiring. The sample comprises all firms-years for the 251 firms that made 
at least one share reacquisition during the sample period. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the amount spent on reacquiring shares in fiscal year t. The amount spent is equal to 
10-9 for firm-years in which no shares are acquired; otherwise it equals the aggregate cost of 
shares reacquired during fiscal year t scaled by lagged total assets. The cash, Low MB, 
underpricing, net leverage and dividend payout variables are defined in Table III. EPS growth is 
the change in earnings per share scaled by lagged earnings per share. Distributable reserves is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if total shareholders’ equity and reserves is negative and 0 otherwise. 
All variables are measured over the fiscal year prior to the reacquisition year. The final two 
columns partition the sample according to the frequency of repurchases. The column headed 
“Single” reports results for firms that repurchase shares in only one year during the sample 
period. The column headed “Multiple” reports results for firms that repurchase shares in two or 
more years during the sample period. Two-tailed probability values are reported in parentheses. 
   Frequency of repurchases 
   Single Multiple 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -29.772 -31.493 -36.446 -27.159 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash holdings 2.385 0.971 0.724 0.916 
 (0.014) (0.382) (0.510) (0.714) 
Cash from operations  11.005 9.275 12.308 
  (0.001) (0.022) (0.016) 
Cash from investing activities  4.027 1.099 8.042 
  (0.091) (0.656) (0.079) 
Low MB 0.853 1.676 1.725 2.349 
 (0.240) (0.053) (0.092) (0.082) 
Underpricing 3.029 3.472 2.583 4.194 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
Net leverage 1.565 2.025 1.797 2.190 
 (0.034) (0.016) (0.069) (0.102) 
Dividend payout ratio -0.114 -0.066 -0.064 0.978 
 (0.427) (0.651) (0.612) (0.238) 
EPS growth -2.627 -1.737 2.155 -5.492 
 (0.049) (0.218) (0.218) (0.010) 
Distributable reserves 0.818 0.067 2.801 -2.516 
 (0.608) (0.968) (0.166) (0.315) 
ACT 6.857 6.274 5.175 7.387 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F 14.93 10.78 5.66 6.85 
Adj-R2 0.0772 0.0866 0.0806 0.1047 
N 1333 1033 532 501 
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 Table V 
Summary Statistics for Firms with Cash Flow Windfalls  
This table presents descriptive statistics for firms citing the desire to distribute excess cash among the list of reasons for a share reacquisition. The 
surplus cash sample is drawn from the initial set of 429 firm-year repurchase observations from January 1995 through December 2000. Each 
surplus cash repurchase observation is matched with a similar nonrepurchasing firm on the basis of industry, cash flow and size (total assets net of 
cash). The cash, market-to-book, underpricing, net leverage and dividend payout variables are defined in Table III. R&D is the ratio of research 
and development to total assets. Board size is the total number board members. Fraction of independent outsiders is the ratio of board members 
with no business or family ties to the firm or to total board size. Founder is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the founder, co-founder or 
a descendant of the founder is a board member and 0 otherwise. Dominant decision maker is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the board 
contains the founder or a combined Chairman and CEO, and 0 otherwise. Tenure is the years of board service for the median director. Number 
board seats is the number of additional directorships in other LSE-listed firms held by the median board member. Board stock ownership is the 
ratio of directors’ beneficial shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Stock-based compensation is the ratio of directors’ outstanding options and 
other stock-based compensation grants to total shares outstanding. Largest external holding is the largest non-insider ownership stake. Aggregate 
institutional ownership is the sum of all identifiable institutional ownership stakes. Two-tailed probability values are based on paired t- (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank) tests of the difference in mean (median) values between the repurchaser and nonrepurchaser samples. 
  Repurchasers  Nonrepurchasers p-value for difference
  N Mean Std Median   Mean  Std Median    (Mean) (Median)
Panel A: Financial variables 
Cash flow from operations           106 0.151 0.126 0.134 0.130 0.100 0.134 0.044 0.050
Cash flow from investing activities 
 
106 -0.032 0.134 -0.056  -0.052 0.261 -0.063 0.366 0.027 
Cash holdings 106          
           
          
           
          
           
          
0.252 0.744 0.073 0.142 0.187 0.092 0.686 0.237
Dividend payout ratio
 
106 0.610 1.080 0.466 0.701 2.597 0.403 0.742 0.079
Underpricing 106 -0.124 0.304 -0.126 0.086 0.800 -0.015 0.011 0.013
Market-to-book ratio
 
106 2.127 1.695 1.502 2.231 3.344 1.468 0.751 0.540
R&D 106 0.011 0.033 0.000 0.007 0.023 0.000 0.059 0.001
Leverage 106 0.359 0.307 0.387 0.415 0.256 0.441 0.067 0.093
Net working capital 
 
106 0.008 0.185 -0.003  0.023 0.164 -0.009 0.463 0.461 
Firm size 106 13.446 2.303 13.286 12.720 2.481 12.594 0.001 0.001
Panel B: Governance variables 
Board size           106 9.358 3.046 9.500 8.538 4.036 7.000 0.031 0.004
Fraction of independent outsiders           106 0.252 0.127 0.250 0.217 0.159 0.222 0.092 0.122
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 Table V continued 
Fraction of affiliated outsiders
 
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
106 0.217 0.133 0.200 0.254 0.174 0.231 0.093 0.154
Board stock ownership 106 0.075 0.145 0.003 0.140 0.191 0.043 0.001 0.001
Fraction of stock-based compensation
 
106 0.009 0.016 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.810 0.366
Largest external holding 106 0.270 0.202 0.245 0.293 0.186 0.269 0.006 0.029
Aggregate ownership by institutions
 
106 0.099 0.063 0.098 0.130 0.103 0.118 0.308 0.276
Tenure of median director (years) 106 5.448 3.158 5.000 5.854 4.580 5.000 0.458 0.606
Number of board seats held by median director 106 0.307 0.496 0.000 0.203 0.497 0.000 0.103 0.048
Founder is a board member (%) 106 17.920    28.300   0.073  
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 Table VI 
The Probability of Using a Share Reacquisition to Distribute Temporary Surplus Cash 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for conditional logistic 
regressions relating the probability of an open market share reacquisition to measures of 
governance quality and a vector of control variables. Each surplus cash repurchase observation is 
matched with a similar nonrepurchasing firm on the basis of industry, cash flow and size (total 
assets net of cash). The number of matched pairs is 106. The dependent variable takes the value 
of one for each matched pair I = 1, … n. All explanatory variables are defined as the difference 
between the ith matched pair. Definitions of the financial (governance) variables are reported in 
Table III (Table V). All variables are measured at the beginning of the reacquisition year. Two-
tailed probability values are reported in parentheses.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Board size 0.064 0.062 -0.152 -0.185 
 (0.275) (0.283) (0.115) (0.061) 
Fraction of independent outsiders -0.086 0.253 -2.273 -1.325 
 (0.950) (0.845) (0.268) (0.502) 
Founder -1.252  -1.016  
 (0.014)  (0.147)  
Dominant decision maker  0.027  0.492 
  (0.943)  (0.389) 
Tenure of median director 0.033 0.015 0.037 0.022 
 (0.134) (0.452) (0.200) (0.426) 
Number of board seats held by median director 0.181 0.213 0.022 0.002 
 (0.607) (0.531) (0.963) (0.997) 
Board stock ownership -5.515 -4.617 -5.167 -3.940 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.040) 
Stock-based compensation 9.390 6.473 2.495 0.797 
 (0.442) (0.583) (0.922) (0.974) 
Largest external holding -4.665 -3.463 -1.176 -0.522 
 (0.151) (0.280) (0.773) (0.901) 
Aggregate institutional ownership -0.578 0.063 0.695 2.333 
 (0.686) (0.965) (0.700) (0.217) 
Cash from operations    10.573 11.104 
   (0.077) (0.053) 
Cash from investing activities    2.510 2.520 
   (0.176) (0.148) 
Cash holdings   1.752 1.716 
   (0.304) (0.324) 
Firm size   0.882 1.002 
   (0.010) (0.004) 
Dividend payout ratio   -0.104 -0.109 
   (0.344) (0.328) 
R&D   70.215 66.983 
   (0.048) (0.046) 
Underpricing   -1.810 -1.462 
   (0.043) (0.099) 
Leverage   -1.645 -1.790 
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   (0.241) (0.210) 
Chi2 30.97 24.265 63.981 62.482 
p-value 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 Predicted probability of making a repurchase for top and bottom quartiles of selected variables 
Board size     
 Top quartile 0.706 0.663 0.872 0.844 
 Bottom quartile 0.649 0.605 0.926 0.919 
Founder     
 Top quartile 0.647  0.860  
 Bottom quartile 0.647  0.860  
Insider stock ownership     
 Top quartile 0.555 0.528 0.855 0.849 
 Bottom quartile 0.775 0.723 0.938 0.920 
Cash from operations      
 Top quartile   0.915 0.902 
 Bottom quartile   0.868 0.847 
Cash from investing activities      
 Top quartile   0.919 0.906 
 Bottom quartile   0.892 0.875 
Firm size     
 Top quartile   0.946 0.942 
 Bottom quartile   0.830 0.791 
R&D     
 Top quartile   0.899 0.883 
 Bottom quartile   0.881 0.864 
Underpricing     
 Top quartile   0.836 0.831 
 Bottom quartile   0.917 0.902 
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 Table VII 
Comparison of Postrepurchase Operating Performance 
This table reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regressions of the 
pairwise difference in postrepurchase operating performance for each repurchaser-nonrepurchaser 
matched pair on the corresponding pairwise difference in prerepurchase operating performance. 
Each surplus cash repurchase observation is matched with a similar nonrepurchasing firm on the 
basis of industry, cash flow and size (total assets net of cash). The number of matched pairs is 
106. To be included in the regression, both the repurchase firm and its matched nonrepurchaser 
must have operating performance data for both the pre- and postrepurchase periods. Operating 
performance is measured as either operating cash flow (model 1) or operating profit (model 2), 
each scaled by total assets net of cash. 
PostiPrei,Posti, eeperformanc Operatingbb  eperformanc Operating ,10 ++=  
 B0 b1 N F Adjusted R2
Panel A: Post = t + 1; Pre = t – 1 
Model 1: Operating cash flow 0.033 0.324 79 3.98 0.037 
 (0.043) (0.049)    
Model 2: Operating profit 0.024 0.415 79 15.32 0.155 
 (0.046) (0.001)    
Panel B: Post = t + 2; Pre = t – 1 
Model 1: Operating cash flow 0.026 0.340 63 4.22 0.049 
 (0.095) (0.044)    
Model 2: Operating profit 0.003 0.808 63 34.05 0.348 
 (0.809) (0.001)    
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 Table VIII 
Comparison of Takeover and Failure Probabilities in the Postrepurchase Period 
This table reports coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for logistic regressions 
comparing the probability of takeover or outright failure for high cash flow repurchaser and 
nonrepurchaser firms in the postrepurchase period. Surplus cash repurchasers are matched with a 
similar nonrepurchasing firm on the basis of industry, cash flow and size. The number of matched 
pairs is 106. The postrepurchase period comprises the two fiscal years immediately following the 
event year. The dependent variable in takeover model is 1 if the firm held formal acquisition or 
merger talks at least once during the postrepurchase period and 0 otherwise. The dependent 
variable in the failure model is 1 if the firm failed to survive to the end of the postrepurchase 
period as an independent listed entity and 0 otherwise. Repurchaser is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 for repurchasing firms and 0 for nonrepurchasers. Firm size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Net leverage is total current liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash and cash 
equivalents divided by total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. Abnormal return is the 12-
month market-adjusted share return. Board stock ownership is the ratio of directors’ beneficial 
shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Founder is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
the founder, co-founder or a descendant of the founder is a board member and 0 otherwise. 
Fraction of independent outsiders is the ratio of board members with no business or family ties to 
the firm to total board size. Blockholder is an indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one external 
stockholder holds ≥ 10 percent of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. All variables are 
measured at the beginning of the reacquisition year. Two-tailed probability values are reported in 
parentheses. 
Variable Pr(Takeover bid) Pr(Failure) 
Intercept 1.461 4.663 
 (0.287) (0.008) 
Repurchaser -0.667 -0.998 
 (0.060) (0.013) 
Firm size -0.159 -0.384 
 (0.095) (0.001) 
Market-to-book 0.085 -0.123 
 (0.174) (0.302) 
Net leverage 0.231 1.520 
 (0.740) (0.067) 
Abnormal returns -0.344 -0.579 
 (0.385) (0.220) 
Board stock ownership -4.897 -3.560 
 (0.006) (0.028) 
Founder -0.020 -0.117 
 (0.964) (0.793) 
Fraction of independent outside directors -1.466 -1.327 
 (0.279) (0.365) 
Blockholder 0.252 -0.178 
 (0.497) (0.687) 
χ2 17.017 25.611 
p-value 0.047 0.004 
N 212 212 
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  Figure 1 
Time-Series Cash Flow Plots 
These figures present plots of median cash flow from operating and investing activities for 
repurchasing and nonrepurchasing firms relative to reacquisition year t. Repurchasers are 
matched with nonrepurchasing firms on the basis of time, industry and size. The number of 
matched pairs in year t – 1 is 268. Medians for both the repurchaser and control samples in years 
other than t – 1 are based on fewer observations due to sample attrition. Both cash flow measures 
are scaled by total assets net of cash holdings. 
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Time-Series Operating Cash Flow Plots 
These figures present plots of mean cash flow from operations (scaled by total assets net of cash) 
for surplus cash flow repurchaser and nonrepurchaser firms relative to reacquisition year t. The 
surplus cash sample, identified using mandated disclosures in firms published annual reports and 
accounts, is drawn from the initial set of 429 firm-year repurchase observations from January 
1995 through December 2000. Each surplus cash repurchaser is matched with a similar 
nonrepurchasing firm on the basis of industry, cash flow and size (total assets net of cash). The 
number of matched pairs in year t – 1 is 106. Means for both the repurchaser and control samples 
in years other than t – 1 are based on fewer observations because of sample attrition. The solid 
() lines correspond to raw operating cash flows while the dashed (− −) lines correspond to 
industry-adjusted values. Industry adjusted values are defined as operating cash flow for sample 
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